

*B. Cole*

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*Draft  
One of the SEAT  
instructions*

Communist Techniques of Infiltrating Key

Government Offices

~~SECRET~~

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Glossary of Abbreviations Used IN THIS STUDY

*(Initials are those proper to the original Spanish-language titles.)*

AFG - Guatemalan Women's Alliance  
AJDG - Democratic Youth Alliance of Guatemala  
CGTG - General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers

CNCG - National Confederation of Guatemalan Peasants

CPUSA - Communist Party of the United States

CTAL - ~~Latin American~~ Confederation of ~~Latin American~~ Workers of Latin America

PAR - Revolutionary Action Party

PCG - Communist Party of Guatemala

PGT - Guatemalan Labor Party (Communist) *II*

PRG - Party of the Guatemalan Revolution

PROG - Workers Revolutionary Party of Guatemala

RN - Party of National Reconstruction

STEG - Union of Guatemalan Educational Workers

WFTU - World Federation of Trade Unions

CAP 5  
→ Introduction

In 1954 the Communist Party of Guatemala ~~was defeated by an armed uprising~~<sup>is</sup> ~~in its attempts to~~<sup>domination of</sup> ~~the nation~~<sup>(was smashed)</sup> by an armed uprising. Violent action was made necessary by the successes which the Communist Party had achieved in infiltrating key government positions and in ~~the~~ establishing control over powerful mass organizations.

This paper is a description of the techniques they <sup>Communist archive</sup> used to ~~win~~ these successes. Important as the techniques were, it is essential to realize that the fundamental strategy adopted by the Communists was exploitation of the cause of nationalism, the widespread desire for social, agrarian and labor reform, and the good faith of a people unfamiliar with the nature of Communism. These ~~conditions~~ ~~factors~~ ~~factors~~ factors created an excellent environment for the use of the techniques <sup>which the Communists developed.</sup>

Much of the <sup>Communist</sup> success was attributable also to the friendly attitudes of the two post-revolutionary presidents. The political philosophy of the first, ~~President Arenal~~<sup>President Arenal</sup>, was basically parallel to Marxism; ~~where~~ his successor, ~~President Arbenz~~<sup>strongly</sup>, was ~~primarily~~ motivated by an opportunity <sup>for rapid nationalism</sup> which caused him to collaborate with the Communists whom he recognized as an ambitious, astute group which was in the ascendance. The Communists ~~g~~ took full advantage of these favorable presidential attitudes.

*extent of Communist infiltration of key government offices and the*  
To understand the political dominance Communists had achieved by *know that from the beginning of their campaign in*  
early 1954 in Guatemala, it is essential ~~to~~ *1944,* to ~~realize~~ they exploited  
the cause of "nationalism" and *successfully* identified Communist goals with social and  
labor action undertaken as part of the entire national reform movement.  
Communists eagerly seized the leadership of ~~all~~ mass movements, sponsoring  
national reforms. *after the fall of the dictatorship in 1944*

Open political activity was possible (at first) to Communists only as they  
worked as individuals ~~xxx~~ from within other left-wing political groups. In  
this way, they obtained many openings ~~wedges~~ in legislative and executive branches  
of the government. Legislative areas *upon which* they particularly concentrated ~~upon~~ were  
~~united front organizations~~ labor, ~~and~~ agrarian and electoral reform *measures,*  
in which Communists were especially interested  
Executive units ~~were~~ those responsible for (communication and propaganda,  
social welfare, agrarian affairs, and education.

The friendly attitude of President Arbenz, who was strongly influenced  
by the two most prominent Communist leaders, finally made possible the legali-  
zation of the Communist Party which had been founded in September 1947. Trans-  
formation of the *Communist-dominated* Democratic Electoral Front of political parties and labor  
unions supporting Arbenz, into a permanent political organ, *whose* ~~the~~ Council, ~~of which~~  
through Communist contrivance, supplanted the ~~Ex~~ Guatemalan Cabinet as a policy-  
making body, brought Communists to the peak of power ~~they attained~~ in 1953-1954.  
Finally, opposition to Communist activity began to take cohesive force, and cer-  
tain failures on the part of the Communists themselves--particularly their  
failure to achieve control of the Army--led to their downfall in ~~June~~ *June* 1954.

I. THE BUILD-UP PERIOD

The Beginning of the Climb. The political upheavals upon which Communists in Guatemala began their rise to power were the revolutions of June and October 1944, which ended a 70-year period of dictatorships. This fluid situation was brought about by young intellectuals--students, young teachers and other people of the professions whose political philosophies were, in many cases, a peculiar mixture of nationalism and Marxism.

Inexperienced and untrained politically, they sought and received political guidance from left-wing Guatemalan intellectuals who had been living abroad during the last years of the dictatorships, and from foreign Communists. At this time there was no Communist Party, since the original Party founded in the 1920's had been wiped out in 1932. The Communists now had to organize a new Party and to find ways of ~~xxxx~~ achieving political influence which would lead to ultimate political dominance.

~~Build-up Period.~~ Advances Made During Arevalo Regime. The first post-revolutionary president, Dr. Juan Jose <sup>all caps</sup> Arevalo, whose political philosophy appears to have ~~become~~ <sup>after his administration, indeed,</sup> progressively closer to ~~Marxism~~, permitted no open Communist organization (political party, indoctrination school) but did allow and encourage Communists to work in other left-wing political parties. Arevalo himself willingly cooperated with them as individuals in the political and labor groups which supported his administration.

In such a political atmosphere, it was logical for the Communists to work through several political media: (1) as members of other political parties participating in the Arevalo administration; (2) as organizers of ~~front associations~~ <sup>mass move-</sup> ~~tions~~ sponsoring popular reform ~~movements~~ <sup>manual</sup> action; (3) as members of a secret Communist Party, led by Jose <sup>all caps</sup> ~~Fortuny~~, which was finally to emerge as the dominant group apparently having Moscow's approval; and (4) as adherents of an open, Communist-line party designed by its founder, Victor Manuel <sup>all caps</sup> ~~Gutierrez~~, ~~as~~ primarily as an indoctrination center for future labor leaders.

1. After the inauguration of President Arbenz, Arevalo <sup>was manual</sup> ~~served~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~astensibly~~ as Ambassador at large for the Guatemalan government. At the time of Arevalo's visit to Mexico in early 1952, the official explanation of the Guatemalan Embassy was that Arevalo was making "a study of the countries of Latin America, particularly their legislative and school systems." At the time of this visit he is reported to have been in contact with Vicente Lombardo Toledano of the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL). (xxxxxxxxxxCTAL)xx

4 It is of interest to note that at the time of the Third Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in October 1953, Lombardo furnished Louis Saillant, WFTU Secretary General, with a comprehensive report of labor, political and economic data on all Latin American countries. Indications that (in addition to being an official spokesman abroad for the Guatemala government of the Arbenz regime) Arevalo may also have been carrying out fact-finding missions for Lombardo and/or the CTAL appear in subsequent reporting showing Arevalo in Uruguay compiling data on the labor situation in June 1954.

(TMM-2648, 19 Mar 1952, HMM-374, B-2, 29 July 1953, Lifter, HUM-187, 9 July 1954.)

~~Possibly Arevalo had collaborated in the compilation of this data~~

Penetration and Exploitation of Other Left-Wing Parties: 1945 to End of Arevalo Administration. As previously stated, President Arevalo permitted and encouraged Communists as individuals to work in the non-Communist, left-wing political parties supporting his administration. As members of these, they were able to participate in national and local elections and to obtain ~~appointments to~~ prominent positions in the legislative and executive branches of the government. ~~by appointment or by election~~ A brief survey of some of the ~~persons~~ and groups) how useful these were in Communists working in other political parties / shows ~~the degree of infiltration~~ achieving Communist infiltration of ~~government~~ Congress during the build-up period:

March 1945: Jose Manuel ~~Fortuny~~<sup>an</sup> was active and far-leftist member of the Popular Front of Liberation, on whose ticket he was elected to Congress.

January 1946: Victor Manuel ~~Gutierrez~~<sup>was</sup> elected deputy to National Congress on Confederation of Guatemalan Workers--Party of Revolutionary Action <sup>(PAR)</sup> ticket, from the Department of Guatemala

1947: Manuel Pinto Usaga <sup>was</sup> elected ~~to~~ on Party of Revolutionary Action--Committee of Syndical Unity ticket to National Congress

November 1950: Party of Revolutionary Action ticket of congressional candidates included at least six individuals of well-known Communist or pro-Communist views.

(RQM-section 1, pp 24-25)



*Note to  
file  
this with  
Paul  
for  
information*

During the Arevalo regime, Professor Mardoqueo <sup>*all cap*</sup> ~~Garcia~~ Asturias was director of the Escuela Normal (Normal School). Although he was a member of PAR, he consistently acted as a Communist, and during his administration of the Normal School a strong communist movement ~~x~~ was started in the school, ~~with~~ and graduates of the school swelled the ranks of the Communist-dominated ~~Democrática Juvenil Alianza~~ <sup>*(AJDG)*</sup> ~~(Alianza de la Juventud Democrática Guatemalteca)~~ and the youth sections of the various left-wing political parties of Arevalo's administration. At the end of 1950, through the efforts of Garcia Asturias, a broadcasting station was set up which was used exclusively by the Normal School and its left-wing administrators. In early 1952, Garcia Asturias was <sup>*appointed*</sup> ~~promoted to the~~ Minister of Public Education. With this key post well within Communist grasp, ~~it was easy~~ the entire Ministry could be heavily infiltrated with Communists and Communist sympathizers. (~~SO-84083~~, ~~27 March 1952, B-3~~)

Mass

*Facilitating Communist Infiltration of Government.*  
Mass Movements: Their Use in ~~Building up~~ Communist Political Strength

In Guatemala, as elsewhere, Communists ~~have~~ attempted to reach every segment of society through a variety of Communist front organizations which were founded ~~for~~ for women, youth, cultural groups, those interested in world peace, and so on. No matter what the specific activity of the club, propaganda to support Communist political objectives <sup>was</sup> soon injected into each of the front organizations' programs. <sup>Once Communist domination was assured and</sup> Particularly in the case of the Communist-dominated labor groups ~~(as will be shown in greater detail)~~ <sup>which</sup> were numerically large, — successful efforts were made to give them a voice in action taken by the National Front.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
<sup>were the</sup> As ostensible leaders of ~~the~~ some of the fronts, <sup>prominent govern-</sup> ment officials of the Arevalo administration <sup>then men</sup> ~~when~~ Communists had selected in order to give the fronts greater prestige. Probably an ulterior motive of Communist leaders who brought public officials into leadership of front groups was to win them over <sup>by making them dependent upon support, (additional footholds)</sup> to Communist ~~ideas~~ and thus to create ~~infiltration~~ in government agencies which would be of use ~~in infiltration~~ for Communist infiltration.

*That step*  
For example, soon after the World Congress of Intellectuals in August 1948 at Breslau, Poland, where a Committee to Defend the Peace was elected, and a program adopted to set up ~~a~~ national branches, a peace committee was set up in Guatemala. <sup>CAP</sup> Julio Gomez Robles, who was then chief of the Guatemala Social Security Institute, was swept into the organization as its first president. The thorough infiltration of the Social Security Institute which was ultimately achieved, was probably facilitated by the "softening-up" of non-Communist officials who were brought into the front organizations. — (fact of Robles' position from RCM blue book)

Sponsorship of legitimate, humanitarian causes by Communist front ~~groups~~  
*indicated to some non-Communists*  
~~impressed some portions of the population with the fact~~ that aims of the Com-  
munists were identical with those of large segments of Guatemalan society. Such  
front organizations as "Committees for Defense Against Foreign Intervention"  
and "Peace Committees" reportedly served to consolidate Communist political ~~strength~~  
strength on the local level between elections.

Labor Reform Movement. Prior to 1944, no labor unions other than con-  
trolled workingmen's national aid societies had been permitted. From mid 1944  
on, a great many trade unions were formed. In August 1945, the Confederation of  
Workers of Guatemala was founded as the first national labor organization.  
Communist labor leaders, former exiles, or labor experts from neighboring countries,  
appeared on the local scene equipped with the necessary talent for labor organi-  
zation work--a talent lacking in most non-Communist reformists of the post  
revolutionary period. *A* Moscow-trained Communist *and other experienced Communist labor leaders*  
*a group of workers, who were*  
school where ~~native Communists, who were later to dominate the labor field~~  
*received* *194*  
~~were~~ instructed in Marxist principles. The PROG also served as a training  
center for trade union activists. *(RQM Blue Book, State "Intervention")*

Communists (of both the underground *Party* *the* and open Communist-line party, PROG)  
together with the labor unions under their influence, formed the National Political  
Committee of Workers (CPNT) to work in the 1950 presidential and congressional  
elections, ~~and thus~~ *this* the labor unions became ~~a~~ politically significant, and were  
a ~~strong~~ ~~major~~ source of strength contributing to Communist penetration of  
government. Communist-influenced labor movements in Guatemala included well  
over 100,000 <sup>members</sup> / The significance of this figure appears when one compares it  
with the total number of votes in the 1950 presidential election: 415,000.

(RQM Blue Book, State Intervention)

Section 6.2

Communist leadership of the labor movement in Guatemala paid generous returns during the following administration when, under Arbenz, Communists were able to secure labor representation in the National Democratic Front, and thus the entire labor movement became a strong, coherent force with the right of political expression.

The Founding of an Underground Communist Party. This was reportedly established during a secret meeting held on 28 September 1947. Its leaders all appear to have been persons who were known publicly as officials of PAR and the labor unions. Fortuny was formally elected Secretary General of this underground group in 1948.

By June 1950 when election of a new government was imminent, the underground Communist Party emerged to the extent that it published a newspaper, Octubre with the sub-heading, "For a Great Communist Party, Vanguard of the Workers, the ~~Rexax~~ Peasants and the People". The group still did not openly profess themselves as the Communist Party, and was known as the "Octubre Communists". The outgoing Arevalo administration did not ban the paper but it did dismiss those of the "Octubre Communist group" from ~~the~~ government positions. In spite of <sup>their</sup> differences with the Arevalo government, <sup>these</sup> Communists collaborated with the parties supporting ~~that government~~ in the presidential campaign of Colonel Arbenz, President Arevalo's chosen successor, and a candidate whom the Communists themselves appeared to favor greatly.

The Open, Communist-Line Party. The underground Communist Party and the Workers Revolutionary Party of Guatemala (PROG), provided the immediate direction for the ~~infiltration and~~ organization and domination of popular reform movements, <sup>especially</sup> labor and agrarian, which were certain to lead to more extensive Communist representation in government office.

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PROG, an open, Communist-line political party, ~~was~~ had a short, specialized existence. As stated previously, Gutierrez conceived of his party ~~as~~ as a school for the training of labor leaders who would guide a slowly developing labor movement. Therefore PROG's membership was necessarily selective. Following a visit to Moscow in January 1952, Gutierrez announced the dissolution of PROG, stated that he would join Fortuny's PCG and advised his followers to do likewise. (State Intervention, p 91) + RQM-C-4- Labor Org

Communist Infiltration of the Powerful National Electoral Board. The Electoral Law, as provided by the Guatemalan Constitution of 1945, was detailed with regard to rules and procedures for the formation, registration and functioning of political parties. Those legal provisions which seemed to encourage the free functioning of political parties in Guatemala were offset by the considerable power, particularly as it applied to the suspension and cancellation of party registrations, which the Electoral Law invested in the National Electoral Board. In practice, the legal position of a party in Guatemala was determined largely by the National Electoral Board, a body comprised of three active and six alternate members. From its inception, it was controlled by the leftist parties, ~~which was controlled by the Communist Party~~. The only legal recourse of a party whose registration was suspended or cancelled was appeal to the Supreme Court, which was theoretically, but not actually, independent of the Executive. (NIS Survey Report - Guate - Pol. Dynamics)

In early 1950 one member of the National Electoral Board was Jose Fortuny. Undoubtedly from this position he took whatever action possible to hinder the movements of conservative political groups and to promote the Communist cause. Later (as will be shown) the Board's membership was predominantly Communist-oriented. ~~RQM-1950 membership of Fortuny on N.E.B. Board~~

in  
(CAPS)

7.  
OK per Harry  
Ginsberg

Communists ~~and~~ considered ~~Arbenz a~~ <sup>valuable asset</sup> ~~Arbenz a~~ <sup>to have</sup> ~~valuable asset~~. Their situation in Guatemala appears <sup>parallel</sup> ~~parallel~~ that of Communists in <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ West European country where the Party does not have a sufficient number of Party members ~~who are~~ <sup>even if available,</sup> capable of holding public positions ~~in case of an emergency situation where the Party might have opportunity to get some of its members into public office.~~ Therefore, that Party reasons that it must get people "who are still not completely on our side but who will cooperate with us." If such people hold public office, the Party intends to put a party member behind them, since they are not yet reliable and convinced Communists. ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~Possibly Fortuny~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~Gutierrez~~ <sup>similarly</sup> were responsible for the political indoctrination of Arbenz. ~~one source has described Arbenz as an ardent disciple of Gutierrez.~~ (ONH-2839, 4 February 1955) ~~7-122)~~

The incidents leading to the arrangement whereby Fortuny became campaign manager/~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> Arbenz' presidential campaign are not entirely clear, but in any case ~~that role~~ <sup>(that role)</sup> ~~Fortuny assumed~~ <sup>as previously stated,</sup> in the summer of 1950. ~~One of the instruments~~ which Communists brought in at this time to promote the campaign was the ~~the~~ <sup>now</sup> labor movement, which ~~by this time~~ <sup>now</sup> was either Communist-controlled or strongly Communist-influenced. ~~The Communists set up a National Political Committee of Workers to support Arbenz and the leftist congressional candidates.~~ <sup>repetition</sup>

(RQM-F-720), ~~State Department, p. 91~~

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Relationship

Communist Influence over President Arbenz. Of primary significance to

the success which Communists <sup>enjoyed</sup> had during the Arbenz ~~regime~~ administration, <sup>in</sup> putting their affiliates in key government positions, were the close personal

relationships between Arbenz and Communist leaders, Jose <sup>Manuel</sup> Fortuny and Victor

Manuel Gutierrez. A glimpse into the personal background ~~story~~ of Arbenz shows and not-overly intelligent that prior to the revolution of 1944, he had been a poverty-stricken/Army captain

whose principal asset <sup>appeared to be</sup> ~~perhaps~~ was an extremely <sup>shrewd</sup> intelligent and ambitious wife. .

Communist leaders <sup>apparently</sup> ~~appear to have~~ recognized Arbenz ~~rather easily~~ as a weak, personality who would be completely manageable in their hands, ~~and thus in the~~

~~summer of 1950 Fortuny appeared as Arbenz' campaign manager for the presidential~~

~~elections.~~ <sup>figured prominently in moving</sup> Opportunism ~~prompted~~ Arbenz and his wife to cooperate with the

<sup>most clever</sup> ~~the Communists~~ and to accumulate as much in the

way of liquid assets as they could during his tenure of office. -(State Inter

vention paper and HGG-1620)

There is also a possibility that Communists may have been able to

protest of anti-Communist groups.

Favorable Climate. With the ~~xx~~ inauguration of President Arbenz on 15 March 1951, the underground Communist Party headed by Jose Fortuny undertook final steps leading to legal existence. In April 1951, Fortuny signed a press statement as "Secretary General of the Communist Party of Guatemala (PCG), which was the first public admission of an organized Communist Party in Guatemala. In spite of the provisions of the 1946 Constitution ~~which~~ and the Electoral Law which specifically forbade "political organizations of a foreign or international character", during 1952 the representatives of PCG were reported in the press as sitting in on President Arbenz' political conferences along with those of other leftist parties of the administration. In ~~October~~ <sup>December</sup> 1952, PCG held its Second Party Congress ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> its name was changed to the Guatemala Labor Party (PGT) to avoid <sup>POPULAR</sup> ~~the~~ resistance to the word "Communist", and ~~probably~~ <sup>facilitate</sup> to ~~assist~~ the legalization of the Party. On ~~xx~~ December 19, 1952, the PGT was registered as a political party in the Civil Registry despite the

- officially changed  
000460030040-3  
caps of 12



#11 Documented evidence exists that certain Communist Party members had been designated to give ideological training to Albany. (check with Paul)

Unification of the Labor Movement Under Communist Leadership. This objective was obviously of primary interest not only to indigenous Communist elements, but to Communist labor leaders of international significance. Even *WFTU* *Sec. Gen'l*, Louis Saillant, attended a labor conference in Guatemala during this period when much activity was ~~going on behind the~~ <sup>discreet</sup> being carried out for the achievement of "labor unity" under Communist control. (TGG-1177)

*(Typist  
pls. spell  
out)*  
The Congress of Land and Air Transport Workers, held in Guatemala from 8 to 15 May 1951, ~~appeared to~~ provided opportunity for foreign Communist labor experts to assist with plans for the consolidation of all urban and ~~rural~~ <sup>rural</sup> workers of Guatemala into one body. At the closing session, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Secretary of the Confederation of Workers of Latin America (CTAL), regional organization of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), stated that the occasion was an important one because the Congress was closing "with all preparations completed for the ~~the~~ <sup>central</sup> unification of the farm and workers movements into a single ~~central~~ organization". (TGG-1177)

In summary, the Communist exploitation of the labor reform movement in Guatemala was achieved by: (a) Communist ~~preparations~~ <sup>preparations for</sup> and ability to seize labor leadership; (b) lack of effective non-Communist labor leaders; (c) absence of native labor union principles ~~which~~ <sup>ing</sup> opposed Marxist ~~ones~~ <sup>labor theory</sup> and therefore the acceptance of the latter by many inexperienced and untrained labor organizers; (d) expert guidance from Communist labor leaders from abroad; and (e) Communist provision of labor training centers in Guatemala.

*the*  
Incorporation of Labor Movement in <sup>the</sup> National Democratic Front

The entire labor ~~force~~ <sup>Movement</sup> became a principal tool for political pressure when, through Communist agitation, the two major labor confederations—one Communist-dominated and the other progressively becoming so—were formally incorporated into the National Democratic Front. The Front, <sup>originally</sup> comprised the four political parties supporting the Arbenz administration: the Party of Revolutionary Action (PAR), the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRG), the Party of National Reconstruction (RN), and the Guatemalan <sup>Labor</sup> ~~Workers~~ Party <sup>(all of which were heavily infiltrated by the Communists)</sup> (PGT). The Front Council, as will be explained, eventually assumed policy-making and advisory roles, working very closely with President Arbenz.

*FBI*  
Agrarian Reform. The introduction of the entire agrarian reform program was largely under Communist supervision. Jose Fortuny ~~has been~~ *was especially active in connection with* ~~reliably reported as responsible for the drafting of the Agrarian Reform Bill.~~ One report describes him as having spent two years studying agrarian reform laws of China, Russia and other countries, ~~xx~~ and as using some of these as material on which to base an agrarian reform law for Guatemala. Fortuny subsequently took an active part in the proceedings of the Guatemalan Congress' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform, although he was neither a member of the Committee nor of Congress.

*Congressional*  
Prior to these deliberations, by decision of the PGT Political Committee, agitators had been sent out into the country to conduct propaganda in favor of the draft law; these agitators were "appropriately informed" by means of courses which the Party had set up as preparation for the agrarian reform. The Special Committee on Agrarian Reform ~~was~~ included three of the four <sup>PGT</sup> deputies ~~to~~ Congress; one of them, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, was Committee chairman. Thus, adequate measures ~~were~~ had been taken to assure Communist control over the program from its ~~very~~ inception. *(RQM-Section C)*

*Pro*  
The entire program as it was actually applied--largely under Communist guidance--was designed to put pressure on the peasantry ( ~~in~~ in order to get land they should support ~~the~~ Communist programs ~~for agrarian reform~~ *demonstrate* ~~to~~ *improve* and to publicize Communist support of peasant interests; and to procure additional government positions for Communists.

The Agrarian Law set up as executive units the National Agrarian Department, the National Agrarian Council, Departmental Agrarian Commissions and ~~the~~ local Agrarian Committees. The ~~xx~~ law assigned a certain portion of the seats on these various agrarian executive bodies to the Communist-dominated CGTG and

the fellow-travelling ~~EME~~ CNCG. These labor groups were especially active among rural elements as the Agrarian Reform Bill was about to be presented to Congress. Subsequent to the enactment in June 1952, CGTG created a key role for itself by setting up an agency giving effective assistance to applicants for agrarian benefits. Thus, an outlet was provided for patronizing Communist supporters and publicizing the role of the Communists in land reform. Furthermore, at public ceremonies where distribution of lands ~~was~~ was made, Communists used every occasion to participate as speakers and to give publicity to their work in ~~the~~ agrarian reform activities. (RQM - section C)

Communists worked continually behind the scenes to <sup>place</sup> ~~place~~ their members in executive units of the Agrarian Reform. They helped one another to obtain employment in key positions of the National Agrarian Department. In February 1954 they succeeded in having the leader of the Communist-front student organization, an employee of the Ministry of Economy, placed as the representative of that Ministry on the National Agrarian Council.



III <sup>CAPA</sup> Arbenz  
Areas of Communist Infiltration of Government <sup>(CASA)</sup>

An increasingly favorable political climate, <sup>Cunning</sup> ~~and a~~ Communist organizational lead in labor and social reform action tactics, and preparedness ~~of~~ to take the ~~lead in labor and social reform action~~ <sup>were</sup> ~~main factors~~ factors mainly responsible for the thorough penetration of government offices which the Communists ~~were to~~ achieved by 1953. Protected by the tolerance of President Arevalo and ~~assisted by the~~ (favor of President Arbenz, ~~the~~ Communists infiltrated their members and ~~supported~~ <sup>executive</sup> ~~their~~ sympathizers in key positions of the public administration, with special concentration on the agrarian reform machinery, the government information and propaganda agencies, ~~and~~ the social security system and public education institutions.

~~23~~ Presidential Advisers. During the Arbenz administration, Communists were among those ~~many~~ who went to <sup>great</sup> ~~some~~ effort to maintain close relations with the President, thus, ~~Jose Fontun~~ ~~came to be one of Arbenz's closest advisers.~~ The group of Presidential advisers, an informal group which has been termed "the Kitchen Cabinet" was ~~six~~ more or less identical in composition with the

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National Council of the/Democratic Front. Largely through Communist effort and manipulation, this group gradually <sup>replaced</sup> ~~replaced~~ the Cabinet as a focal point for policy formulation.

Of the ten members of the Council who attended meetings in early 1954, four were PGT members, and of the remaining six, at least four were Communist sympathizers. Protests of the Arbenz administration that its Cabinet contained not one Communist were therefore meaningless, since the Cabinet, through clever Communist maneuvering and unswerving Presidential support, <sup>no longer</sup> ~~became an~~ carried out its legitimate functions, ~~executive rather than policy making body.~~ Thus, the Arbenz administration, at the highest level, was dominated by PGT leaders. (State, RQM)

(b) The National Electoral Board. As previously stated, control over this body as it was set up by legislation of 1945 was exercised by left-wing parties/mf which had brought about the Guatemala revolution. By March 1952 the active membership comprised two pro-Communists and one sympathizer of the pro-Government Party, the ~~Fronte Popular Liberador~~ FPL which cooperated ~~with~~ closely with the Communists. One of the pro-Communists on this board in 1951 was Jaime Diaz Rozzotto; it was reportedly due to his maneuvering prior to the Congressional elections of 1 March 1952 that the Communists had obtained the presidency of three Congressional Committees: Revision of the Labor Code, Agrarian Reform, and ~~the Committee for the~~ Revision of Contracts between the Guatemala government and Foreign Companies. (State, Guate #1054, 27 April 1954, TGG-1461 (SO-86946)). Two members of the National Electoral Board in 1953 were ~~schoolteachers of the intellectual group of~~ Communist intellectuals; one of whom was president of the Communist-front, Casa de Cultura. ~~Membership in~~ 1953, per Miss Miller of Guate Desk; description: State Intervention, p. 63)

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Congress. As previously stated, by the end of 1953, the National Democratic Front, which the Communists were able to manipulate according to their own interests, held 51 of 56 seats in the Guatemalan Congress. The PGT itself (as of mid-1954) had only four ~~known~~ official representatives in the unicameral Congress, but these four held key positions: Victor

← Manuel Gutierrez was First Secretary of Congress (~~1954-1955~~) and Chairman of Congress' Special Committee on Agrarian Reform; (~~1952-1954~~); Jose Alberto ~~and~~ Cardoza was chairman of the Special Committee on Revision of the Labor Code (~~1952-1954~~); <sup>d</sup> During the 1953-54 sessions, Carlos Manuel Pellecer was the most vociferous administration supporter and organizer on the floor. (~~State intervention, pp 71-72~~) Besides the PGT's <sup>known</sup> ~~official~~ representatives, however, at least a dozen more deputies were ~~probably~~ Communist sympathizers or possibly secret Party members. ~~For example, Major Marco Antonio Franco Chacon, Communist sympathizer, prominent in "peace" activities, and a traveler to the World Peace Council meeting in Budapest, Hungary in June 1953, and who was elected President of Congress for the 1954-1955 session.~~

→ An expression of good wishes ~~to~~ to the Third World Youth Festival, published on 23 August 1951 in the Diario de Centro America, the official publication of the Guatemalan government, was signed by eleven deputies to the Guatemalan Congress. One excellent illustration of Communist infiltration of a Congress is ~~afforded~~ exemplified by Major Marco Antonio Franco Chacon, Communist sympathizer prominent in "peace" activities, <sup>who</sup> ~~and a~~ traveled to the World Peace Council meeting in Budapest, Hungary in June 1953, and who was elected President of Congress for the 1954-1955 session.

~~Agrarian~~ Agrarian Affairs. Despite the fact that ~~only a small fraction of~~ <sup>very few</sup> names of PGT members were ever made public, a significant number of the employees of the National Agrarian Department (Departamento Agrario Nacional) appeared among them. The Department was headed by Major Alfonso Martinez Estevez, an opportunist <sup>(ie)</sup> non-Communist who was President Arbenz' private secretary until July 1, 1952; however, Waldemar Barrios Klee, the head of the Lands Section, who acted as Chief when Major Martinez was absent, was a PGT member. The Secretary General of the National Agrarian Department, through whom all documents were ~~channeled~~ <sup>channeled</sup> was the wife of Jose Fortuny.

at least ~~fifteen~~ <sup>fifteen</sup> Of the twenty agrarian inspectors of the National Agrarian Department, ~~seventeen~~ were reportedly either Communists or Communist sympathizers. Another dozen of the Department's employees were known Party members. A Guatemalan newspaper, the independent El Espectador of September 9, 1953, made the charge that "85 percent" of all departmental employees adhered to the PGT. <sup>this</sup> statement ~~which~~ <sup>nevertheless</sup> was possibly an exaggeration, but vindictive of the Communist coloration of that Department.

The influence of the PGT over the agrarian reform was further facilitated by the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 17, 1952, as amended. In addition to the National Agrarian Department, the law established local Agrarian

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Committees which passed in the first instance on petitions for the expropriation and distribution of land; departmental Agrarian Commissions, which were the first reviewing authority; and a National Agrarian Council, which was the final court of appeal under the President. The law, as amended, provided

that specific percentages of all these bodies should be representatives of the ~~Communist dominated Trade union Confederations,~~  
CGTG or CNCG. ~~(National Confederation of Guatemalan Peasants)~~ For example,

60% of the local Agrarian Committees were to be representatives of CGTG or CNCG. Since the ~~CGTG~~ <sup>CGTG</sup> ~~former was labor confederation~~ was definitely Communist controlled, and the ~~latter~~ <sup>CNCG was</sup> progressively ~~becoming~~ <sup>coming</sup> under Communist domination, the PGT had forceful tools ~~in the hands of the organizations~~ for directing the course and pace of agrarian reform action. ~~(State Intervention, RQM)~~  
~~State Def. Date 8/8, 29 March 54~~

~~The Institute of Social Security.~~ Some eighteen ~~members~~ <sup>functionaries</sup> of this agency were either ~~PGT~~ Communists or sympathizers, including its director, Alfonso Solorzano. Actually, the Institute of Social Security was a stronghold of "nonparty" Communists who supported the PGT program but were not always organizationally at peace with Jose Fortuny's dominant clique in the PGT. ~~Alfonso Solorzano was at one time a member of the Mexican Communist Party from which he was expelled (date not known), but he considers himself ideologically a better Communist than the ruling members of the PGT who in many cases were his pupils in ideological training schools.~~ <sup>reportedly at one time</sup>

~~Definitive~~ ~~(State Intervention p. 71)~~

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Ministry of Communications and Government Publication Offices. In 1953, Carlos ALVARADO Jerez, an avowed Communist was appointed Director General of Radio Broadcasting and director of the national radio station, "TGW". In early 1954 a well-known Honduran Communist, Medardo MEJIA, was still on the staff of ~~xxx~~ the Government's official gazette. Paul Leiva, a faithful propagandist for Communism, remained in the President's Office for Publicity and Propaganda. (~~State Intervention, p. 71, RGM Blue Book, Section C Propa Dev.~~)

a Nicaraguan Communist,  
Ministry of Public Education. In 1952 Edelberto TORRES, headed the Editorial Office, Ministry of Education, and taught in the University of ~~Sanz@arlx~~ San Carlos, the national university.

A principal instrument for Communist infiltration of the educational system was the Communist-dominated Union of Guatemalan Educational Workers <sup>its</sup> (STEG); ~~was~~ Secretary General ~~of which~~ was Rafael TISCHLER, a registered PGT member, who visited the Soviet Union in 1953. STEG wielded considerable power in the Escuela Normal Central de Varones, and the new teachers graduated from this school were mostly Communists, due to the influence of the faculty. As many of the Communist graduates as possible were placed in Guatemala City schools and in the better rural schools. All government teachers were required to belong to STEG. (~~CO D 77737, 2 Aug 1954, State Intervention, p.71~~)

*I throughout the ARBENZ administration, the government's official newspaper, the Diario de Centro America had a consistent pro-Communist slant.*

~~Other~~ Other Governmental Departments. In the Ministry of Economy and Labor,  
the Under Secretary, Luis Emilio ANZUETO, a PAR member <sup>and</sup> strong supporter  
of Communist-front activities, ~~was a frequent speaker~~ figured prominently in <sup>the</sup>  
<sup>Communist-organized</sup> National Conference in Defense of the Rights of Youth in February 1953.

Hugo Barrios Klee, a PGT member, was ~~Deputy~~ Deputy Inspector General of Labor  
in this Ministry. ~~A departmental labor inspector,~~ Humberto Pineda, Labor  
Inspector in the Department of Santa Rosa, was <sup>reportedly</sup> ~~identified~~ as a PGT member.

~~State Dep. 713, 18 Feb 54 + State Intelligence, p. 71~~  
~~The fact that the Federal Police was effectively penetrated was known~~  
~~from the following incident: For three months in early 1954, a transmitter~~  
~~located in the Federal Police building in Guatemala City was used to jam~~  
~~"The Anti-Communist Hour" a program broadcast over an independent radio~~  
~~station, Radio Internacional of Guatemala City.~~

In the Guatemalan Postal Service, mail addressed to the PGT <sup>reportedly</sup> was handled  
separately and, by prior arrangement with postal authorities, was not subject  
to censorship. Correspondence addressed to "reactionary groups" in Guatemala  
was censored and the contents delivered to the PGT when of interest. Thus,  
through its infiltration of the postal service, the PGT obtained a considerable  
amount of information about the plans of anti-Communist groups, their organi-  
zations, and foreign contacts. (CS 26862, 9 Dec 53)

HGG-357

OF THE OPPOSITION

IV

## CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION ACHIEVEMENTS AND THE REACTION

In summary, the PGT built up effective means of infiltrating key government positions by exploiting a fluid, revolutionary situation and, playing upon the theme of nationalism, skillfully presenting Communist aims as identical with those of Guatemalan national aspirations. This was followed by concrete steps to achieve political power by working (a) from within non-Communist but left-wing political parties; (b) from an underground Communist Party; (c) <sup>from</sup> a Communist-line political party; and (d) from leadership positions of the mass movements--especially the labor reform movement--which became <sup>and sentence which is on reverse here</sup> a strong political force. By energetic Communist action <sup>within</sup> ~~springing from~~ all these bodies, Communists succeeded in placing secret Party members and fellow travelers in key legislative and executive positions of the Arevalo administration. Concentrated effort appears to have been made to attain positions which could be used to manipulate the electoral laws, <sup>and to enact</sup> ~~to formulate legislative~~ and agrarian measures. ~~and to enact~~ <sup>labor/reform</sup> ~~measures.~~

<sup>a very strongly pro-Communist</sup> With ~~the~~ candidate stepping into the office of the Presidency in early 1951, the entire Communist organization step-by-step came into the open, <sup>and</sup> was unified and legalized. The close personal relationship between <sup>Arbenz</sup> and the two most prominent Communist Party leaders was <sup>a</sup> most significant factor in permitting <sup>ever increasing</sup> infiltration of government agencies and exercise of Communist influence from the office of the <sup>legislative</sup> Presidency down through the ~~other~~ executive units.

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Of particular value <sup>also</sup> for increasing Communist strength and permitting subsequent infiltration of government office on both the local and the national levels <sup>was</sup> the ~~agrarian~~ agrarian reform movement <sup>was</sup> which ~~was~~ largely under Communist leadership.

The ~~max~~ emergence of an open, legal Communist Party and the ~~progressively greater~~ power it steadily manifested under President Arbenz caused a polarization of opposition among anti-Communist~~x~~ professional, business, military, university and Catholic groups, even though some --especially professional and business people--had welcomed the end of the dictatorships and had acquiesced in early phases of the revolution's social reforms. Eventually they objected to the extremist groups (Communists and pro-Communists) which held ~~most of~~ the reins of government control. *(State - pp 84-85)* *national*

Failure on the part of the Communists themselves to control the national Army and to develop adequate "self-defense" committees (Party controlled military forces), as well as their undue reliance upon ~~the~~ *presidential* favor, ~~of ARBENZ~~, also contributed to their downfall. Belated and inadequate efforts were made to arm the peasants and workers affiliated with CNCG and CGTG and to organize armed units comprising members of the pro-ARBENZ coalition parties forming the National Front. Instructions were issued that members of these units had to be of "absolute revolutionary security".  
(~~Dec 21, Dec 22 of "Documentary Evidence" paper; CS 42248 based on Guate~~  
~~970, 971, 976~~). On 27 June 1954, ARBENZ and his Communist-oriented regime fell from power. Communists and pro-Communists fled into political asylum or went underground with the Communist Party (Guatemalan Labor Party) which was declared illegal.

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